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REASONABLY PRECISE SPECIFICATIONS AND THE
MILITARY CONTRACTOR DEFENSE-THE ELEVENTH
CIRCUIT MISAPPLIES THE BOYLE TEST: BRINSON V.
RAYTHEON CO.
MICHAEL LYoNs*
SA GENERAL RULE, federal law may preempt state law in
atters involving "uniquely federal interests;" specifically,
those areas of the law subject to federal control under federal
laws and the Constitution.' In Boyle v. United Technologies Corp.,
the U.S. Supreme Court held that "procurement of equipment
by the United States" is one such area; and therefore, that sup-
pliers of military equipment may enjoy immunity from liability
under state law.2 This immunity is not automatic.' Rather, sup-
pliers of military equipment must meet the criteria set forth by
the Supreme Court in Boyle before receiving the immunity.' In
Brinson v. Raytheon Co., the Eleventh Circuit erred in allowing
the trial court's use of post-design, post-production data as evi-
dence to satisfy the first prong of the Boyle test, thus erroneously
allowing the defendant immunity.' In doing so, the Eleventh
Circuit too broadly construed the type of evidence that may sat-
isfy Boyle's requirement of "reasonably precise specifications." 6
Judson B. Brinson, an instructor in the Joint Primary Aircraft
Training System Program (JPATS) and a captain in the U.S. Air
Force, died in a plane crash on April 3, 2004, while co-piloting
the T-6A Texan II (T-6A), an airplane manufactured by Ray-
theon Aircraft Company (RAC).' RAC designed the T-6A, a sin-
* J.D. Candidate, Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law,
2011; B.A., the University of Texas at Austin, 2002. The author would like to
thank his wife for her love, encouragement, and support.
1 487 U.S. 500, 504 (1988).
2 Id. at 507.
3 Id. at 507-08.
4 Id. at 507-12.
Brinson v. Raytheon Co., 571 F.3d 1348, 1351-52 (11th Cir. 2009).
6 Id.
7 Id. at 1349.
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gle-propeller aircraft, to fly like a jet, as JPATS intended to use
the aircraft to train pilots to flyjets.8 In order to accomplish the
jet-like flight of the T-6A, RAC included a trim aid device (TAD)
on the T-6A.' The TAD automatically adjusted the aircraft's
rudder to enable it to fly like a jet.o RAC developed and pat-
ented the TAD prior to construction of the T-6A aircraft, with
no input from the government." The plaintiff in Brinson con-
tended that the malfunction of the TAD led to the crash of the
T-6A and the death of Brinson.1 2 Four months before the crash
of the T-6A, the U.S. Air Force issued an order requiring inspec-
tion and replacement of Teflon-lined pushrods, a component of
the TAD, on all T-6A model aircraft." In this order, the Air
Force required that the pushrods be replaced with identical
pushrods, and the Air Force completed the installation of
replacements in the aircraft flown by Brinson prior to the crash
on April 3, 2004.14 In 2006, after the crash at issue in Brinson,
the military required the replacement of Teflon-lined rod ends
on all T-6A model aircraft with rod ends of an alternate
material. '5
Julie Brinson brought suit against RAC individually and as the
surviving spouse of Judson Brinson.'" The U.S. District Court
for the Middle District of Georgia granted RAC summary judg-
ment, holding that the military contractor defense immunized
RAC from tort liability under state law.1 7 Julie Brinson appealed
to the Eleventh Circuit, which affirmed the trial court's grant of
summary judgment, holding that RAC put on sufficient evi-
dence to satisfy the Boyle test, and stating that "post-design, post-
production evidence" may be used to satisfy the Boyle standard."
Although the "procurement of equipment by the United
States is an area of uniquely federal interest," and thus qualifies
as an area where state law may be preempted by federal law,
federal law will only control in two instances: 1) when there is a









16 Id. at 1348.
17 Id. at 1349.
is Id. at 1349-53.
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application of state law would 'frustrate specific objectives' of
federal legislation." 9 These guidelines gave rise to what is now
referred to as "the military contractor defense," which grants
military contractors immunity from liability under state law for
design defects. 2 0 To enjoy this immunity, the contractor must
prove that it acted at the direction of the government by estab-
lishing the three factors required by the Supreme Court in Boyle.
1) the United States approved "reasonably precise specifica-
tions;" 2) the equipment supplied by the contractor met those
specifications; and 3) the contractor informed the United States
of any dangers in using the equipment known to the contractor
but unknown to the United States. In essence, the contractor
must be able to state "that the government made me do it" in
order to enjoy immunity under the Boyle doctrine.2 2
Brinson argued that RAC did not produce summary judgment
evidence sufficient to satisfy the first two elements of the Boyle
test, but the first element was the major point of contention in
the case and is the focus of this casenote.2 s In affirming the trial
court's order, the Eleventh Circuit held that "post-design, post-
production evidence may fit within the Boyle rationale," and thus
it may be used to satisfy the first prong of the Boyle test.24 The
question of whether to allow post-design, post-production evi-
dence to apply to the first prong of the Boyle test presented an
issue of first impression for the Eleventh Circuit.2 5 The Elev-
enth Circuit's decision to permit this type of evidence to satisfy
the first prong of the Boyle test purportedly followed decisions of
the Fourth Circuit in Dowd v. Textron, Inc. and the Second Cir-
cuit in Lewis v. Babcock Industries, Inc.2 6
The Eleventh Circuit correctly stated that the first prong of
the Boyle test requires proving two separate factors: "'reasonably
precise specifications and government approval of them.' "2  In
other words, if the contractor makes design decisions alone and
the government only approves of "general guidelines," then the
19 Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 (1988).
20 Brinson, 571 F.3d at 1351.
21 Id. (quoting Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507).
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id. at 1353.
25 Id. at 1352.
26 Id. at 1353-54.
27 Id. at 1351 (quoting Gray v. Lockheed Aeronautical Sys. Co., 125 F.3d 1371,
1377 (10th Cir. 1997)).
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contractor will not be immune from state law liability.28 The
Eleventh Circuit cited two of its prior decisions to illustrate this
point.29 In Gray v. Lockheed Aeronautical Systems Co., the defen-
dant did not carry its summary judgment burden because it sub-
mitted to the government only a description of the
requirements the design feature in question addressed, without
ever submitting detailed drawings.3o The Eleventh Circuit com-
pared and distinguished this decision with Harduvel v. General
Dynamics Corp., in which the Eleventh Circuit ruled that the de-
fendant did carry its summary judgment burden because the de-
fendant showed that government engineers specifically reviewed
and approved the design feature in question by analyzing
blueprints and drawings and engaging in discussions with the
defendant during the reviewing and approval of the design fea-
ture .3 These cases were not dispositive of the issue, however,
because RAC also presented evidence of the U.S. Air Force's or-
der to inspect and replace the pushrods, well after the T-6A air-
craft were designed and built, as pertinent evidence in meeting
the requirement of the first prong of the Boyle test.12
The Eleventh Circuit first turned its analysis to an examina-
tion of the Supreme Court's reasoning in Boyle and concluded
that the Supreme Court created the Boyle test to allow courts to
identify the circumstances in which a "'significant conflict be-
tween federal interests and state law in the context of Govern-
ment procurement"' exists. 33 Thus, the Boyle test essentially
identifies circumstances when the military contractor defense
should apply. 34 The Supreme Court in Boyle, citing § 2680(a) of
the Federal Tort Claims Act, stated that although the Act al-
lowed recovery against the United States for negligence of Gov-
ernment employees, it excluded claims "'based upon the
exercise or performance . . . [of] a discretionary function or
duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Gov-
ernment, whether or not the discretion involved be abused."'3 5
28 Id. at 1351-52.
29 Id. at 1352.
30 Id. (citing Gray, 125 F.3d at 1374, abrogated on other grounds by Gray v. Lock-
heed Aeronautical Sys. Co., 155 F.3d 1342 (11th Cir. 1998)).
31 Id. (citing Harduvel v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 878 F.2d 1311, 1320 (11th Cir.
1989)).
32 Id. at 1352.
3 Id. (quoting Boyle v.- United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511 (1988)).
3 Id.
3 Id. at 1353 (quoting Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511; 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2000); 28
U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2000)).
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The Supreme Court further stated that when the Armed Forces
selects designs for military equipment, that selection process
falls under the discretionary parameters of the Act because it
involves balancing of design considerations, particularly "be-
tween greater safety and greater combat effectiveness."3 6 The
Supreme Court concluded that allowing state tort suits for these
military decisions would abrogate the intention of the Act.37
The Eleventh Circuit then extended the Boyle rationale, con-
cluding that post-design, post-production evidence may be used
to prove the first prong of the Boyle test, likening decisions by
the military of how to address defective or failing parts to the
decisions of the military in original equipment designs."
The Eleventh Circuit found support for this decision in the
Fourth Circuit's decision in Dowd v. Textron, Inc.39 That case in-
volved a fatal helicopter crash, and the Fourth Circuit held that
the defendant established government approval of the design.4 0
In doing so, the Fourth Circuit relied on two facts: 1) the Army
investigated the specific design feature that caused the crash sev-
eral years after its original design; and 2) the manufacturer and
the Army exchanged information regarding the specific feature,
the manufacturer suggested modifications to address the prob-
lem, and the Army rejected them." The Eleventh Circuit also
cited the Second Circuit's decision in Lewis v. Babcock Industries,
Inc. as support for its conclusion.4 2 Lewis involved spinal injuries
to a pilot due to a failure of a specific design feature on a jet
fighter. 3 The Second Circuit held that because the Air Force
became aware of and investigated an issue with the specific de-
sign feature, and then addressed the problem by replacing the
part at issue with new but identical parts, the contractor met the
requirement of showing Government approval of "reasonably
precise specifications."" The Second Circuit therefore allowed
state tort law immunity for the manufacturer under the military
contractor defense. 5
6 Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511.
3 Id. at 511-12.
- Brinson, 571 F.3d at 1353.
39 Id. at 1353-54.
40 Id. (citing Dowd v. Textron, Inc., 792 F.2d 409, 410 (4th Cir. 1986)).
41 Id.
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Applying this decision to the facts of the case, the Eleventh
Circuit concluded that RAC showed that the U.S. Air Force ap-
proved "reasonably precise specifications" of the TAD during its
development by: 1) reviewing drawings of all components on
the T-6A; and 2) reviewing the complete aircraft to ensure it
complied with those earlier drawings.4 6 But the Eleventh Circuit
also concluded that in January 2004, after the product was de-
signed, built, and deployed, the military knew of the design de-
fect with the TAD and issued an order to address the problem:
that order specifically required the replacement of failing
pushrods with identical pushrods. 47 In dismissing the appel-
lant's argument that the approval was not a "meaningful ap-
proval," as required by the Boyle test, the Eleventh Circuit held
that appellee put forth enough uncontroverted evidence to give
rise to a "persuasive indication" that the military gave "meaning-
ful approval" and thus satisfied the first prong of the Boyle
criteria.48
This conclusion by the Eleventh Circuit misapplies the re-
quirements and motivation of the Supreme Court's decision in
Boyle. First, the holding by the Eleventh Circuit in Brinson un-
necessarily expands Boyle and makes the military contractor de-
fense much easier to prove than originally intended. As the
Eleventh Circuit discussed, RAC presented evidence of discus-
sions between the Air Force and RAC during the design of the
T-6A, review of RAC designs by the Air Force, and inspections by
the government during the actual development of the T-6A. 4 9
This evidence is arguably enough to satisfy the Boyle criteria.
The Eleventh Circuit then needlessly held that, essentially, evi-
dence of reordering of parts by the Air Force could be included
as evidence for purposes of satisfying the Boyle test.o
Additionally, the Supreme Court specifically noted that one of
the primary reasons behind the military contractor defense is
that the military must make decisions regarding safety and com-
bat effectiveness to effectively pursue its goals. 1 If this is the
46 Id. at 1354-55.
4 Id. at 1355.
4 See id. at 1355-56 (detailing evidence showing that the Air Force examined
drawings and work instructions of the TAD, reviewed the "as-built" configuration
of the component, and was aware of the design defect in question).
4 Id. at 1354-55.
50 Id. at 1355.
51 Id. at 1353 (quoting Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 511
(1988)).
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motivation behind the military contractor defense, then there is
no reason to grant government contractors immunity for train-
ing equipment. The Eleventh Circuit ignores the fact that RAC
developed the aircraft in question as a training device and not as
equipment for use in combat settings.52 Courts should allow
more liberal construal of the military contractor defense for
those products intended for combat use, as opposed to products
such as the T-6A. In other words, in cases involving products
that will never see combat, courts should view the military con-
tractor defense with more skepticism and require greater evi-
dence of military approval of "reasonably precise specifications"
because the government should not have to balance between
safety and combat effectiveness for training equipment.
Another distinction must be drawn between the Brinson case
and the Dowd case. The evidence in Dowd showed that the origi-
nal contractor suggested modifications based upon the known
defect and that the Army rejected them." But in BHrinson, there
was no evidence that RAC suggested modifications to address
the defective rods in the TAD system on the T-6A." The Dowd
case represents the first reported decision where a court allowed
post-design, post-production information as evidence under the
first prong of the Boyle test.5 5 After Dowd, the Second Circuit
decided Lewis, which had facts analogous to the Binson case
before the Eleventh Circuit. Like the Eleventh Circuit in Brin-
son, the Lewis case also misapplied the Boyle test. In both Brinson
and Lewis, the evidence suggested a unilateral decision by the
government to address a design defect by replacing it with an
identical component. 6 Courts should, at the very least, distin-
guish between circumstances such as those presented in Dowd
and circumstances such as those presented in Brinson and
Lewis-the former representing a situation where the govern-
ment acts with the input of the contractor, and the latter repre-
senting situations where the government acts unilaterally.
Allowing post-design, post-production evidence to satisfy the
first prong of the Boyle test should not be permissible when such
evidence does not in any way indicate that the government ap-
proved of the component in question at the time of the develop-
ment and building of the product itself. Allowing the
52 Id. at 1349.
53 Dowd v. Textron, Inc., 792 F.2d 409, 410-11 (4th Cir. 1986).
54 Id. at 1353-54 (citing Dowd, 792 F.2d at 410-12).
5 Id. at 1353.
56 Id. at 1354-56.
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reordering of a part to suffice as evidence under the Boyle test is
too easily exploitable; government entities order replacement
parts from contractors on a regular basis. To hold otherwise
essentially means that any time a member of the armed forces
reorders a part, even if it is without discussions about possible
defects with the contractor, then the contractor will be able to
present some evidence that satisfies the first prong of the Boyle
test. In essence, any simple reorder of any replacement part by
the military may now be sufficient evidence of government ap-
proval of "reasonably precise specifications" under the Boyle test.
This interpretation misinterprets and overly expands the mili-
tary contractor defense.
